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A s  cal led fo r  i n  qy contract  with t h e  Agency fo r  In te rna t ions l  Development 
dated June 18, 1964. This report ,  together with t he  attached "Report t o  
Korean Governinent 1966 %port  Development" should he considered my f i n d  report  
i n  my capacity a s  advisor t o  t he  Korean Government on export promotion and 
pr iva te  enterpr ise .  The attached repor t  f s ,  i n  i t s e l f ,  a complete and de ta i led  
analysis  of the  problems as they e x i s t  a3 of t h i s  writ ing,  together with a 
ae r i e s  of recommendat.fons and suggestions t o  the  Korean Government t h a t  should 
assist i n  fur ther  developing t h e  export program. This report  was presented 
t o  t he  Korean Government a t  a meeting of t he  Economic Co-operation Committee 
held October 21, 1966. This meeting was presided over by Deputy PrLme Minister 
Chang Key Young, EPR and Mr.  Joel  Bernstein, Director, USOM~K and by a number 
af t he  Minfstries and other  o f f i c i a l s  of t h e  Economic Ministr ies.  
I n  t he  course of t he  last  two years I have a l so  submitted monthly reports ,  
and numerous separate  reports  on spec ia l  problems and a c t i v i t i e s .  A l l  t h e  above 
contain within themselves detailed descr ipt ions  of many a c t i v i t i e s  f o r  t he  pas t  
two years. There i s  very l i t t l e  t h a t  I can zdd at t h i s  point  t h a t  has not 
already been amply covered. It is, therefore,  my be l i e f  t h a t  the  most useful  
service  I can render i n  t h i s  paper is t o  d e s x i b e  i n  broad t e rns  methods used 
i n  developing of t he  export program f o r  Karea during the pas t  two years, and 
t h e  s t eps  t h a t  were taken t o  assist i n  i ts  success. Nhile such developments 
must, 0:" necessity,  be unique t o  t h e  tJae and co1:ntry i n  which they take place 
t h e  s to ry  here nevertheless, may possibly be useful  t o  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  o ther  
p a r t s  of t h e  world where similar condit ions ex is t .  
General Conditions, November, 1964 
- 
The first report  prepared by t h i s  o f f i c e  covering tho months of October 
and November 1964,, contains the  fo lbwing  statements :: 
"Korea is a t  a turning point  i n  i t s  i n d u s t ~ i a l  development. The first 
period a f t e r  t h e  War r e q d r e d  recovery and t h e  develop;rl!ent of t he  basic 
inciustries. I n  t he  fu ture  there u i l l  be requ%red moye and new development 
i n  power, t ransporta t ion,  mining, a g ~ i c C l t u r e ,  ard o ths r  Sasle  i rdustry .  
However, s u f f i c i e n t  advances have been m d e  SO t h a t  Korea i s  turning t o  t he  
production of consumer goods and export items, This process n i w t  now he gfwn 
considerable a t t en t ion  and e f fo r t .  Correcting t h e  balance of payments 
s i t u a t i o n  is of such paramount importance t h a t  a major e f f o r t  tc  increase  
exports is essent ia l .  Concurrently and necessary both t o  t h i s  e f f o r t  and t o  
t he  r a i s ing  of the  standad cf lit-icg i s  t h e  development cf t he  pr iva te  sec tor  
of industry, t he  increase  of t h e  medim-sized industr ies ,  t.ne food indca t r ies  , 
and the  promotion of foreign inve3tment. Although there  a r e  many products in 
which indigenous raw mater ia ls  can be ased such 8s f i s h  and ~ea food ,  f r u i t ,  
ceraflics, s i l k ,  c e r t a in  mining products, livestack and other  agr icu l tu re  
~ r ~ u c t s ,  otc., most of the  developnent invclves the  processing of t he  conbina- 
t i o n  of Lndigenous and substantra l  qcsntitfe~ cf Pnparted mte~id!s. 
"The major asse t  availahle i s  low wage lal3or. Low wage labor  is only 
low cost labor i f  it is also a t  l e a s t  pa r t i a l ly  e f f i c i en t  and i.€ there is a 
f a i r  amount of good productivity. Korean workmen are  in t e l l igen t ,  l i t e r a t e ,  
ingenious, learn  quickly and have good mechanical aptitude. Therefore, with 
some management and technical t raining it can a l so  become highly competitive. 
In Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and other East Asian countries, the wage 
l eve l  has been increased and there i s  a drcp off i n  the industr ies  depending 
on low cost  labor. In the long 1:un the ?reatest  industt;ial development w i l l  
cccur as a r e su l t  of a higher st:mdard of l i v i n e  induced i n  p a r t  by higher 
productivity, higher wages, and la rge r  consumer c o n s ~ t i o n  and export 
development. In the growth period, and t z r t a in ly  at  present, Korea can f i l l  
t h i s  gap. In the process it w i l l  fur ther  expand its own consumer and export 
industrf 8s. 9 
In t h a t  report we l i s t e d  the major problems we toresaw at tha t  time. 
There was a long list which included problems of: qual i ty  control; qual i ty  
standards; design; business ethics ,  taxes, customs and f inancial  incentives; 
ava i lab i l i ty  of raw materials; delays due t o  paper procedural work. Also 
included were sales and problems of marketing, overseas ac t iv i t i e s ,  market 
research, d i f f i c u l t i e s  for  businessmen to t ravel  abroad, and many others 
t o  lengthy t o  l is t  here. 
One of the  major problems was poor coordination between government 
ministries and agencies concerned with these problems, and with the  private  
business comunity'l In  addition, there were and still  a re  no branches of 
foreign banks having off ices  i n  Korea. 
Ins t i tu t ions  1964 
Although expoarts f o r  the  previous year (1964) were valued a t  $83,000,000, 
there were already a limber of exis t ing ins t i tu t ions  and organizations tha t  
were concerned w i t h  development i n  t h i s  area. The Korea Trade Promotion 
Corporation, a ~overnment agency which was i n  existance f o r  seversl  years, 
had dbveloped a s t a f f  and an overseas organization. The Ifinistry of Commerce 
Rc Industry had an export section, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs i n  the c beginning of 1964 + ~ o k  over the commercial attaches i n  the  various overseas ..- 
off ices  who were prbviously under the responsibili ty of the  Ministry of 
Commsrce & Industry. The leading private  organization concerned with trade 
was the Korea Traders Association; the  other two major business organization 
were the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Korea Businessmen's Association. In 
addition, t h e  Bank of Korea and the Economic Planning Board were involved i n  
activk-ies i n  the development of exports. 
There were, however, only casual and uncoordinated re la t ions  between a l l  
the element and organizations involved. There was also lacking an overal l  
programatic and policy approach t o  t h e  problems involved. 
b o r t  Situation. 1964 
&ports up t o  t h a t  time were as follows: 
A good portion of these exports were i n  basic raw materialls such a s  tungsten, 
coal, clqys and s i l k  yarn. ?hilt3 there were a number of manufacturing 
industr ies  i n  existence, and a few qui te  modern, they were primarily serving 
the domestic market. Pusinessmnn's business philosophy was based on the 
inf lat ionary econow? then i n  existence. Large p ro f i t s  could be made by 
importine and d is t r ibut ing  raw materials and other products, by construction, 
land sp-eculation, and building of factories  and inventories. In such an 
inf lat ignary economy, efficiency of operation was unimportant. Production 
i n  competition with the international market was not a s  a t taac t ive  as the  
other me&s of p ro f i t  making. 
Exporting required careful a t tent ion t o  quality,  design and price. In 
addition, Korean businessmen had 1ittI .a o r  no contact with the outside world, 
and were unfamiliar with markets, market research, and methods of doing business 
abroad. A t  the same time, the rest of the  world had l i t t l e  knowledge o.f or  
f a i th  i n  Korean products. 
Stabi l izat ion 
The balance-of -payments d e f i c i t  fo r  1963 had been $228,900,000 and f o r  
l9& $57,300,000. IiYih the A I D  program's s h i f t  from grant aid t o  development 
loans, anrl the prosbect of future decreased a id ,  it was incrsasingly evident 
tha t  Korea's future 'economic health depended upon planning towards correction 
of the  balance-of-payments s i tuat ion,  and developing i ts  manufacturink 
industr ies  and export trade t o  accomplish the above. The f i r s t  s t e ~  of necessity, 
was the establishment of the  s tabi l iza t ion  program and a f loat ing r a t e  of exch,mge. 
With the  aasiatance and help of USOII, the Korean Government developed measures 
t o  accomplish this .  The s tabi l iza t ion  program was announced, and a f loat ing 
r a t e  of exchange was put i n t o  ef fec t  i n  March, 1964. The rate of exchange moved 
up from approximately 250 Won t o  the dol lar ,  t o  270, and it has r d r . d  at, t h a t  
level u n t i l  t h i s  writing. While the l ega l  s teps  had been taken, there was still 
a big job of education of the business conxnunity. A s table  economy and f loat ing 
r a t e  of exchange required an ent i re ly  d i f ferent  kind of business philosophy. 
Business had t o  turn its thoughts toward ef f ic ient  operation, s tab le  financial 
management, and the development of oxports. This, i r  turn, reqitircd an outward 
lool<. St,,?hhiaotion save the basis  for  export develo~~nent ,  hut there was required 
an overall  program tha t  would tackle the many problems tha t  !braan industry 
faced t o  make i t  possible t o  achieve substantial  export gcals. 
Since a cookdinated , overal l  approach was. required, the USOM Director 
had determined t h a t  a similar approach was necessarj within the USOM 
structure.  The development of an export program involved every aspect of 
USOM a c t i v i t i e s  - - programing, economics, finance, industry, technical 
assistance, agriculture, fishing --- were all involved. The Director 
established my job which was t o  a c t  a s  a focal point for  ideas and coordination 
of a c t i v i t i e s  i n  development of txs program. 
Obviously, export development would be primarily created by the manu:. 
facturers,  traders,  and business community. It was, essent ial  t h a t  government 
formulate the pol ic ies  and control tha t  would stimulate the 'usinessmen i n t o  
t h i s  effort .  It therefore was necessary t o  become acquainted with the  
business community, a s  well as the government o f f i c i a l s  concerned with t h i s  
aci;ivity. While the I.?ission had, of course, i n  previous years developed a 
great many contacts with the business commun.$ty, because of the  nature of 
i ts  ac t iv i t i e s ,  there was no central  focal point f o r  these contacts. They 
had been developed primarily i n  spec i f ic  industr ies  and companies t o  which 
the  Mission had granted 3oans o r  assistance. It.was important t h a t  t h e  business 
conmunity, through its col lect ive leadership, should have a means of exchanging 
opinions with the  18ssion through intimate contact and also have a sense t h a t  
iCs opinions were being l is tened to. 
I spent the  first several months meeting with the executive committees 
of  alZ the major and many of the minor business association, both i n  Seoul 
and other  c i t i e s  i n  the  country. Out  of t h i s  developed a regular se r i e s  of 
small luncheon msetings with the key organizations. The most important of 
these was a bi-monthly meeting with the Presidents of the "Big 3", the 
Korea Businessmen's Association, Korea Traders Association, and Korea Chamber 
of Conn;ie~-ce. There was limited attendance, and without fanfare or  publicity. 
At these meetings I was accompanied a t  times by the  Director, Deputy Director, 
Deputy Chief o.f TVss5.011 o r  Embassy Zco6omic  office^, and other senior-level 
- s t a f f  mem5ers of USOM and FlSnhassg. These meetings i n  the course of the  l a s t  
two years have proven extremely valuable, and the  businessmen have repeatedly 
s tated they found them a new and f r u i t f u l  means o* comnunication and a method 
of cooperation. In addition, there were separate monthly luncheons with top 
s t a f f  of each of  these organizations. There was a weekly luncheon with the 
- President, and occasionally other s t a f f  members o= the Korea Trade Promotion 
- Corporation. Later when the  Korean Marketing Association was established, 
they were included i n  the regular l i s t  of bi-monthly luncheons. Alth~iigh 
with considerably l e s s  power, but of great important was the  organization of 
Medium Industry Cooperatives Federation. This organization represented 65 other 
cooperatives, with a t o t a l  membership of approximately 7,500 small husinesscs, 
There were unplanned 5ut  jnnumerahle meetincs and luncheons with trade 
- organizations and individual businessmen, hoCh Tor the purpose of get t ing 
t h e i r  point of view, and t o  make t h e i r  acquaintance. To inform qyse3.f of 
i ndus t r i a l  capabili t ies,  I have v is i ted  a great number of factories  throughout t h o  
country. 
The next task  was t o  become tkorougt3y acquainted with every element 
h i th in  t h e  government s t ruc ture  t h a t  would have a function in t h e  development 
of exports. The w i n  respons ib i l i t~ i  had been established within the  Piinistry 
of Commerce and Iridustry. I n  t h e  area of agr icu l tura l  exports, t h e  respon- 
s i b i l i t y  wbs  i n  t h e  iaAnistry of Agriculture and Forestry, and t h e  Office of 
Monopoly had the  responsibi l i ty  f o r  tobacco, ginseng, a d  any other products 
it controlled. There was then and s t i l l  ex i s t s  today i n  a much l e s se r  fom,  
an a t t i t u d e  i n  other Iilinistries, and i n  MCI i t s e l f ,  t o  consider t h e  en t i r e  
responsibi l i ty  tha t  of M C I ,  with the  s d l  exceptions noted above. Problems 
i n  t h e  development of exports involved, i n  addition t o  t h e  above, t he  Kinistry 
of F i n a c e ,  Ministrg of F o r e i ~ n  Affairs, Ministry of Transportation, customs 
o f f i c i a l s ,  inspection agencies, t h e  government-controlled banking ins t i tu t ions ,  
and a great  many quasi-off ic ial  t r ade  organizations. 
While there existed communication between the  various agencies and 
minis tr ies ,  it became obvious t h a t  a coordinating agency should bring together 
both t h e  public and pr ivate  organizations involved i n  this ef for t .  There h;d 
been established on paper a conmuttee t h a t  would accomplish t h i s ,  Also 
included was a US011 representative on t h i s  committee. I n  practice t h e  com- 
mittee was non-existent, and I began t o  probe t h e  fee l ings  of t h e  various 
elements regbrding such a cormnittee. While there was general agreement as 
t o  i t s  usefulness, much of the  acceptance was mere l i p  service. Inter-  
minis te r ia l  prerogatives, d i s t r u s t  between t h e  business comunity and govern- 
ment agencies, and general i n e r t i a  mit igatedagainst  act ivat ion of such a 
s tructure.  It required a continuous campaign of explanation and education 
t o  gain complete acceptance of t h i s  concept. I n  March, 1964, a s  par t  of t h e  
export development program, t h e  commit;tee was o f f i c i a l l y  established a s  a sub- 
corn i t tee  of tlic Il;conolcic Cooperati on Council. Bj agreement between USCl! 
a d  EPf3 at the  highest levels ,  USON representatives were made part  of t h i s  
conzittee,  The co-chairmen of the  -01% Promotion Sub-committee were t h e  
Vice Minister of Commerce and Industry and the  Deputy Uirector of USOEI. The 
s teer ing committee consisted of t h e  Assistant Minister of MCI  and me. 
Membership included a number of vice ministers of t h e  economic ministries,  
high-level representatives of t h e  banks, t h e  President of KCTRA, and the  
Presidents of t h e  four major business organizations mentioned above. After 
careful  consideration and consultation, a whole se r i e s  of working groups'were 
established. They consisted of s taff- level  representatives of a p p r o ~ r i a t e  
minis tr ies  and pr ivate  business organizations with spec i f ic  assignments of 
f i n a x e  and taxation, marketing, qual i ty  control, informaticn,procedures, agri-  
culture,  seafood, heavy industry, l i g h t  industry, and rdning, F ~ c h  of these 
working groups had an appropriate USOX technician as a member. 
The act ivat ion of these working groups required considerable e f f o r t  on 
t h e  par t  of t h e  s teer ing committee. At. f i r s t  i t  was t h e  incl inct ion of i t s  
members t o  consider t h a t  the  working grotqs existed merely t o  concern themselves 
with measures directed toward obtaining assistance from USOX. AS t h e i r  work 
progressed, they gradually began t o  function a s  overa l l  policy-making cormbttees 
formulating plans and recorimendations f o r  implementing t h e  basic export program 
established by the  government. Since t h i s  committee was not a governnlent 
agency, it had no power other than t o  make recormendations. However, t he  
recordt'for the  past  t14o years shows almost a l l  of the recommendations proposed 
by t h i s  committee were adopted by various government agencies. The recommenda- 
- 
t ions  t h a t  it had formulated during t h e  f i r s t  year became, t o  a large ex$ent, 
pa r t  of the export program f o r  the second year. A s  t h e  overal l  program 
developed, government ins t i tu t ions  and private  organizations more and more 
took on the functions required f o r  i t s  implementation, The conrmitteecs work 
- changed t o  one of formulating broad pol icies ,  M n g  the  second year. the 
number of working groups reduced, the number of meetings lessened, as did the 
- number of people required i n  attendance, We have recently recommended tha t  
- f o r  the coming year the s t ructure be re-examined i n  the l i g h t  of i ts experiences, 
and i t s  functions be further reduced, 
Toward the  end of 1965, and again i n  1966 a complete report  was prepared 
and presented to  the Economic Cooperation Council. The report presentation was 
attended by tho Deputy Prime Minister and USOM Director as chainnen, and the 
ministers:: and other important o f f i c i a l s  of the major economic ministr ies  and 
government organizations concerned, These reports were given serious attention, 
and i ts  recommendations assisted i n  formulating government polLcy and actions, 
There i s  no doubt tha t  the  success of export expansion was assisted by 
the  foxmation and the  a c t i v i t i e s  of t h e  EPSC, 
Early i n  1964, the  Korean Government determined t h a t  export development L/ 
was t o  have a very high p r io r i ty  i n  its economic development program, Exports 
f o r  1964 reached more than $120 million, President Park by pu5lic announcement, 
proclaimed the  high p r io r i ty  given t o  t h i s  program, He ins t i tu t ed  a monthly 
meeting a t  the  Blue Housb.:at which he was personrlljt given the l a t e s t  report 
on the program. The whole machinery of zovernment was put behind t h i s  act ivi ty,  - 
The first s t ep  was the formation of an export program, It w a s  decided 
t h a t  an overall  program should be developed. The direct ion of formulating t h i s  
program w a s  given t o  the then Assistant Hinister Lee Chul Seung of MCI, He 
asked USOII fo r  assistance, The USOI! Director gave high p r i o r i t y  t o  t h i s  work, 
The USOM Export Cormnittee and many elements within the llission with the 
personal part ic ipat ion of the Director and Deputy Director, devoted many hours 
t o  aiding i n  the  development of th5s program,. There were dai ly  and continuous 
consultations between the Assistant I a n i s t e r  and the USOEQ Export Advisor, The 
progrm as f i n a l l y  formulated, was a mixture o f  broad policies,  a statement 
of purpose i n  cer ta in  f ie lds ,  spec i f ic  and detailed implementation measures 
i n  others, and a aer ies  of predictions, Some of it was poorly defined and 
overly generalized, but most of all it was an attempt t o  bring i n t o  o m  program 
every phase of a c t i v i t y  required, It included financial and taxation measures, 
a se r i e s  of studies,  technical instructions,  research proposals, marketing 
measures, references t o  spec i f ic  industries,  and the e s t ab l i shme~t  of some 
new, and strengthening of other required ins t i tu t ions ,  The important thing 
was t h a t  i n  one s ingle program were brought together a l l  the elements and 
measures required t o  carry out  the President's instructions,  Included i n  the  
program was the establ ish of the  EPSC previously described, 
Because of the  nature of the program, it became the task of government 
agencies and t he  EPSC i t s e l f  t o  analyze and develop the ideas i n  t.he program, 
and make recommendations accordingly. Obviously, it was impossible t o  under- 
take the development of the program covering every industry and comodity. 
It was necessary to se lec t  those t h a t  gave the most promise. The c r i t e r i a  
tha t  was established stated tha t  the ef for t  should be directed toward developing 
products with the biggest foreign exchange earnings, towards industr ies  tha t  
use native raw materials, commodities with the  highest labor content, and where 
exist ing f a c i l i t i e s  and expansion required the  smallest capi ta l  outlay. In 
practice, these ru les  could not be completely adhered to, The biggest s ingle 
factor for the  developing industr ies  was the  market for  the  products s o  produced. 
Information available indicated tha t  consumer goods and semi-durable products, 
with cer tain food products, would be the major industr ies  involved. 
Since it was necessary t o  have a connaodity-by-commodity approach, there 
were assigned by IICI and NOFA about 35 commodity chiefs, each representing 
a s ingle commodity, While reporting d i rec t ly  t o  the ministries involved, they 
also coordinated t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  with the  various working groups of EPSC. 
Each comodity chief was required t o  submit reports to  the appropriate worldng 
group. It was suggested by EPSC t h a t  within each industry each commodit?r chief 
should work with the representatives of t h a t  industry t o  set up a corni t toe 
i n  an advisorj  capacity. This instruct ion was carried out i n  some areas, but 
was not f u l f i l l e d  i n  others. 
USOM technical advisors, being attached t o  every committee were able t o  
a s s i s t  and give the benefit  of t h e i r  experience and knowledge t o  each committee. 
This en t i r e  structure,  while spotty i n  some areas, o r  well developed i n  others, 
nevertheless was extremely helpful a t  every l eve l  of ac t iv i ty  i n  the  export 
f ie ld  
One of the  great  problem of the Korean Government was the  inexperience 
of ' a  substantial  pa r t  of its s taf f .  The 1961 coup had removed from off ice almost 
every element previoulrrly involved i n  governnent. Most of t h j  new s t a f f ing  was 
young, new and inexperienced, and very few of then had any actual  business o r  
trade experience. Therefore, t h i s  s t ruc ture  described above a l so  assis ted i n  
t ra in ing  and educating middle-level government of f ic ia ls ,  
As the s tabi l iza t ion  program took effect ,  t h e  busfness conmunity very 
rapidly accepted the  new philosophy requirix! t o  operate within t h i s  new frame- 
work. With the impetus of stimulating measures, and benefits and p r i o r i t i e s  
given t o  exports by the  government, more and more industries became interested 
and involved i n  t h i s  activity.  Recause Korea had for  so many :rears been a 
"hennit kingdom", which was followed by Japanese occupation and two warsp 
businessmen had very l i t t l e  experience i n  deeling with the foreign business 
world. Business methods, qual i ty  control, design requirements, and above a l l ,  
methods of marketing were l i t t le  known. For t h e  same reasons, t he  outs ide  
world, and pa r t i cu l a r ly  t h e  commercial world, had l i t t l e  knowledge of Korea 
& 
- 
and i ts  p o s s i l ~ i l i t i e s ,  Even though k r e a  was already manufacturing many 
items t h a t  were acceptable, they were l i t t l e  known o r  appreciated, 
There was a l a ck  of knowledge hj Koreans of t he  necessary s t eps  t o  be 
taken t o  pht  t h e i r  goods on the  in te rna t iona l  market, Overseas a c t i v i t i e s  and 
budgets of KOTRA were limited,  Travel by pr iva te  businessmeii had been hampered 
with many r e s t r i c t i ons  and d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  obtaining foreign exchange, Few 
buyers were in te res ted  i n  coming t o  Korea, It became obvious t h a t  an extensive 
program of overseas marketing a c t i v i t i e s  would have t o  be developed, mile 
Korea already had many products t h a t  could be sold, she had many more t h a t  . .  ' 
were c lose  t o  meeting t he  requirements of t he  in te rna t iona l  buying community, 
but  not  qu i t e  up t o  par. With he r  low l abo r  cost ,  there  was a danger t h a t  
t h e  anxiety t o  sell would br ing t o  Korea many "bargain hunters:'; people who 
were in te res ted  i n  one-shot deals,  buying the  lowest qua l i t y  goods, The 
first period of Japan's post-war development was precisely  along these  l i ne s ,  
and it took Japan many years  t o  overcome t h e  reputat ion it had developed f o r  
producing low-priced, low-quality goods. 
As a matter of pol icy it was determined e f f o r t s  would be made t o  prevent 
Korea from going through such a period, I n  order t o  do t h i s ,  it would be 
necessary t o  a t t r a c t  buyers from the  l a r g e  chains who ware in te res ted  i n  
purchasing a r t i c l e s  i n  t h e  middle-price leve l ,  Since Korea's major export 
i tem was inexpensive labor,  she could not  compete aga ins t  mass-produced, high- 
volumc indus t r i e s  i n  t he  advanced countries, Only i n  such comodi t ies  where 
there  was a l a r g e  l abo r  content could he r  advantages be felt. However, t h i s  
a l s o  en ta i led  a qua l i t y  requirement t h a t  needed care fu l  a t tent ion,  It was 
determined t o  attempt t o  a t t r a c t  buyers who would take  a "developmental" 
approach t o  purchasing i n  Korea, I n  other  words, such conpanies who would be 
wi l l i ng  t o  assist with technical  he lp  and guidance, and who would he prepared 
t o  pu t  t h e i r  time, e f fo r t ,  and possibly  money i n  i n i t i a l  small-scale purchases 
which would eventually lead t o  c rea t ing  good sources of supply. 
I n  accordance with t he  above policy,  it was suggested t h a t  an attempt be 
made t o  induce t he  top executives of t he  leading s t o r e  buying c h ~ i i ~ s  in t h e  
United S t a t e s  t o  come t o  Korea. For t h i s  purpose i t  was necessary t o  r?roWlize 
t h e  leading business organizations, KCY.TRA and the  American Chamber of Cdmmerco 
i n  Korea t o  undertake t h i s  project ,  nocause of t he  inexperience describer! 
a h ,  t h e  business organizations were re luc tan t  t o  i nves t  funds i n  a p ro j ec t  
they f e l t  wodd not br ing any immediate results, It was important t h i s  p ro jec t  
be flnanced by the  Kolqeans themselves, The sum involved was not  large,  but  
it took considerable convincing t o  ge t  agreement on t h i s  matter, F ina l ly  a 
committoe was established,  and the  funds pledged, t.J , 6-. , . ,I / 
Although there  had been considerable correspondence with t he  America:? 
buying chains, there  had been no great  enthusiasm on t h e t r  p a r t  f o r  pa r t i c ipa t i on  
i n  t h i e  project ,  It was there fore  determined t h a t  lfr, Oh Pum Sik, President of 
KOTRA and me should go t o  t h e  United States ,  visit the  heads of important buying 
chains, and del ivery personal i nv i t a t i ons  t o  cone t o  Ssoul as guests of t he  
Yoreans. The ass i s tance  of A I D ~ ~ J ,  t he  U,S, Department of Commerce and i ts 
I 
various f i e l d  off ices ,  Korean embassies and c o n s u l ~ t e s  was invoked. Through 
t h e  U.S. government agencies it was possiSle t o  Itopen the door1' t o  meet 
t he  highest executives of these organizations. 
We a lso  took advantage of our presence i n  the USA t o  meet with many 
leading banking ins t i tu t ions ,  discussing potent ial  t rade and investment i n  
Korea. Numerous meetings were held, conferences arranged i n  Washington, New 
York, Chicago, Los Angelos,San Francisco and Seat t le .  R. H. Macy i n  par t i -  
cular, who had previously opened an o f f i ce  i n  Seoul, was very helpful i n  
ass i s t ing  through personal so l i c i t a t ions  of t1;e many other chains. The t r i p  
proved highly successful. I n  October, 1965 t h e  representatives of nine of 
the  la rges t  American buying chains arrived i n  Seoul. These included 
representatives of J. C. Penney, W. C. Grant, Sears iioebuck, Montgomery Ward, 
the  Mw- Company chains, Allied Stores,  Nacyls, Amerex Corporation and 
\Joolworth. Thcre were several others t h a t  could not come a t  t h a t  time, but 
arrived l a t e r .  An e-xtensive program of exhibits,  factory v i s i t s  and conferences 
were arranged by the Koreans under t h e  leadersliip of KOTRA. Meetines with top  
l eve l  Korean slld k r i c a n  Government o f f i c i a l s  were arranged. The t o t a l  r e t a i l  
business i n  t h e  United S ta t e s  represented by these groups was i n  t h e  neighbor- 
hood of $15 b i l l i o n  annually. While it would be a gross exaggeration t o  claim 
t h i s  t r i p  opened up Korea, it nevertheless paved F e  way f o r  a g n a t  many of 
the buyers who subsequently have come here. So& of these companies opened 
offices;  others  have made arrangements with Korean t rading companies t o  
represent them; and subs tant ia l  purchases a re  taking place. Sone companies 
finding a potent ia l  source of supply, carr ied out t h e  developmental approach 
by sending full-time technicians t o  assist Korean f ac to r i e s  i n  improving the  
qual i ty  and design of t h e i r  products so t h a t  they might be acceptable. Others 
ass i s ted  through t h e i r  buying agents, and by sen.ding i n  professional buyers 
i n  t h e  various l ines  of in t e re s t .  R. H. Macy decided t o  include Korea and 
its products i n  its ltFar East Festival! which took place i n  September, 1966, 
and which was highly successful. 
Pa r t ly  because of this, and because of the  information the  world was 
- beginning t o  obtain about Korea, there  has been an ever-increasing flow of 
- 
- buyers and businessmen coming t o  Korea. 
TRADE MISSIONS 
Also w h i l e  on t h i s  t r i p ,  we v i s i t ed  t h e  Chicago and S e a t t l e  Chambers of 
Commerce, both of whom were planning Far East t rade missions. Plans for t h e  
Chicago group had already advanced too  f a r  t o  permit a change, but were 
able t o  induce t h e  Sea t t l e  group t o  include Korea i n  t h e i r  i t inerary .  Governor 
Evans of the  S ta t e  of Washington accompanied t h i s  tour,  whicl~ a l so  proved t o  
be highly successful i n  making Korea be t t e r  known t o  the  American business 
comunity. The horeans were themselves organizing t rade  missions t o  various 
par t s  of t h e  world including Japan, Southeast Asia, Africa and Europe, and 
missions from many of these countries were coming t o  Korea both on t h e i r  own, 
and a t  t h e  inv i t a t ion  of various Korean business groups and KOTRA. 
Before departing on t h e  above zantioned t r i p  t o  t h a  United States ,  
arrangements had been made through AII2,hf and the Department of Commerce 
f o r  the Korea Businessmen Association 1;o send large t rade mission t o  t h e  
United States. Seventeen top-level butlinessman and bankers spent three  
weeks i n  the  United States,  meeting busliiess leaders, merchants and 
bankers, v i s i t ing  s tores  and factories ,  and i n  general, making excellent 
- 
contacts. 
, - -I 
- 1--I.----- 
Production Problems 
A s  previously explained, Korean industry, with some exceptions, was 
inexperienced i n  t h e  requirements of quality,  design, packaging, specifications 
and price t h a t  would enable them t o  compete internztionally.  Major problems 
i n  technical development, equipment, productivity, and cost accounting remained 
t o  be solved. This required a broad a t tack  on these problems, both by industry 
and on a comodity-by-commodity basis. There were already several Korean 
ins t i tu t ions  working i n  these areas. The Korea Productivity Center, established 
several years previously, had been devoting most of i t s  a t ten t ion  t o  management 
training. The National Indus t r ia l  Research I n s t i t u t e  which was la rge ly  
equipped with AID funds, was t h e  respor.aib1e government agency f o r  qual i ty  
testing. It was not suf f ic ient ly  u t i l ized ,  and it required more and be t t e r  
t raining s t a f f .  Research i n s t i t u t e s  attached t o  the  some of the  universi t ies  
were inadequate. Private  company laboratories and t e s t ing  equipment varied 
from company t o  company, some verjT good, but most inadequate, i ne f f i c i en t ly  
used, or non-existent. There was much work t o  be. done. 
The Export Developmerlt Program had called for  t h e  establishment of an 
export inspection service, and government cer t i f ica t ion  was required f o r  cer tain 
comnodities p r io r  t o  export. However, the  system was inadequate, and could 
not possibly cope with a l l  the  requirements. 
A s  a r e s u l t  of the  program developed by EPSC and MCI, USOM agreed t o  
furnish assistance and technical help in  many f ie lds .  An advisor was appointed 
t o  t h e  export laboratory. Four spec ia l i s t  technicians werc assigned t o  KPC. 
A consultant was brought i n  t o  review KOTRA ac t iv i t i e s .  Other consultants 
were brought i n  t o  study qual i ty  control, t h e  men's apparel industry, marketing, 
- 
and handicrafts. 
- 
In t h e  f i e l d  of agr icul tura l  developmenL f o r  export, new products were 
being developed and programs devised t o  export canned and preserved f r u i t s ,  
vegetables and seafood. 
Obviously, u n t i l  t h e  Korean businessmen were convinced t h a t  t h i s  help 
was essent ial ,  and they were willing t o  make t h e i r  own effor ts ,  t h e  program 
would be useless. There i s  one specif ic  project tha t  should be noted i n  
part icular  f o r  many similar ones hopefully t o  follow. The City of Taegu, which 
is t h e  fourth la rges t  indus t r i a l  center i n  Korea, contains a variety of 
industries.  One plant i n  part icular ,  Cheil Wool Conpany, is one of t h e  most 
modern md best wool weaving compmies, equal t o  t h e  best i n  t h e  world. 
The sixteen leading indus t r i a l i s t s  i n  Taegu had forded an industry association, 
- and established t h e i r  own productivity center. They had appealed t o  USOK 
- f o r  help. I n  addition t o  t h e  indus t r i a l i s t s ,  t h e  loca l  government o f f i c i a l s  
and chamber of commerce were a lso  involved. The loca l  government decided t o  
contribute toward a new building f o r  an expanded laboratory. USON contributed 
some funds f o r  its equipment. After agreement with the  loca l  c o d t t e e  t o  
contribute loca l  s t a f f ,  and money, USOK agreed t o  send s i x  technicians t o  
a work i n  Taegu a t  t h e  factory level.  T h i s  regional approach i s  already proving 
- i ts  merit, and has received enthusiastic support of the  loca l  business 
comunity. Other c i t i e s  and areas a r e  observing t h i s  experiment, and have 
indicated in te res t  i n  developing similar projects  of t h e i r  own. 
A program of sending teams of Koreans from specif ic  industr ies  and in te res t s  
- t o  nearby countries t o  study the  methods used these countries was undertaken. 
- USOM financed teams i n  qual i ty  control, t h e  garment industry, handicraft, and 
ceramics. The teams v i s i t ed  Japan, Taipei and Hong Kong. A team of top-level 
business executives was sent  t o  t h e  United Sta tes  a s  an llimpactn group t o  , . 
meet with top  American business management. 
a During t h e  surmk~rs of 1965 and 1966 four part ic ipants  were sent each year 
- t o  t h e  Internat ional  Marketing I n s t i t u t e  serdnar i n  Cambridge, Eiassachusetts 
t o  par t ic ipa te  .in studies  on marketing, which included t r i p s  t o  many c i t i e s  
t h e  United S t ~ t e s ,  
Upon t h e i r  return, these teams and individuals prepared reports, and, with 
- varying degrees of succeas, t h e i r  knowledge obtained on these t r i p s  was passed 
- on t o  others. 
Almost immediately a f t e r  nly a r r i v a l  i n  Korea, the  Minister of Commerce and 
Industry called a t ten t ion  t o  the  f ac t  t h a t  procedures and paperwork were 
- cumbersome and time consuming, This o f f i ce  proceeded t o  make three  careful  
studieb of the  procedures involved i n  exporting, importing raw materials, and 
procedures required foZ businessmen t o  t r ave l  abroad. These were presented 
t o  t h e  government and suostantiated what had been suspected by the  Minister. 
The Procedures Comittee of EPSC did some work i n  reducing t h e  amount of 
paperwork time involved. MCI has now requested USOH t o  supply a dis interested 
outside consultant t o  a s s i s t  i n  improving export procedures. EPSC a lso  
determined t h a t  it would be desirable t o  establ ish an internat ional  commercial 
a rb i t ra t ion  syste11it0 handle disputes and claims ar i s ing  between foreign and 
Korean businessmen. Enabling leg is la t ion  was passed i n  March of 1966, and 
t h e  Korea Chamber of Commerce established a Commercial Arbitration Association. 
USOM has been asked t o  supply a consultant t o  assist i n  the  implementation 
of t h e  law. 
EPSC a l so  recommended tha establishment of an export insurance system. 
- 
- 
This should be very helpful, par t icu lar ly  if it becomes possible i n  the  future 
t o  s e l l  on credi t  terms. USOM has been asked t o  supply a consultant t o  a s s i s t  
i n  establishing such a system. 
A l l  t he  above obviously can only touch on a srnall portion of the export 
ac t iv i t ies .  It a lso  concerns itself, t o  a la rge  extent, with those a c t i v i t i e s  
i n  which USOlI and this advisor are involved. Simultaneously, an3 i n  many 
ways, individual businessmen, and t raders  wore engaged i n  developing exports, 
s e l l ing  and traveling abroad t o  promote t h e i r  business. American t raders  
of long residence i n  Korea were d i rec t ing  more and more of t h e i r  e f for t s  away 
from imports t o  exportrr. Most of the e f f o r t  was due t o  the  work of the 
Koreans themselves, and t h e i r  success has been 3henombnal. Exports have 
grown fmn $32 million i n  1960 t o  a ta rge t  of $250 million established for  
1966, which v d l l  undoubtedly be achieved. Outsiders such as ourselves, have 
only been able t o  a s s i s t  and ac'?,d.se. The bulk of the work is being done by 
Korean Government o f f i c i a l s  and businessmen, As they gain experience and 
knowledge, l e s s  and less assistance w i l l  be required from outsiders, and i n  
the not too d i s t an t  future, Korea w i l l  require l i t t l e  o r  no assistance i n  t h i s  
f i e ld  . 
Militam Purchasing; 
Purchasing hy U.S. mi l i ta ry  forcee located i n  Korea has create6 a steady 
and substant ial  amount of do l l a r  earnings. These have been approximately 
$35 million annually since 1960. In 1964 the  f igure was $34,410,000, There 
is an obvious built-in l imi ta t ion  i n  the poss ib i l i i5 . e~  of l a rge  increases. 
The U.S. gold flow problem a s  well as the  i n a b i l i t y  of Korean industry t o  
produce many of the items required, added t o  the l imitat ions of the  whole buying 
program, precludes any large-scale increases. Nevertheless, ear ly  i n  our 
a c t i v i t i e s  we determined t o  invest igate  the  poss ib i l i t i e s  of a fur ther  develop- 
ment of sales t o  the  military. This could not only serve the  purpose of 
increased do l l a r  earnings, but it would a l so  help Korean industry develop 
products t h a t  codd  be a lso  be sold commercially. The U.S. Army had already 
done a good deal  of work i n  a s s i s t ing  Koreans t o  produce new products acceptable 
t o  the high standards demanded by them. Such items as  rubber t i r e s ,  auto 
bat ter ies ,  shrimp, and many other products were d i rec t ly  a resu l t  of these 
ac t iv i t ies .  With the  new indus t r ies  deueloped, Koreans f e l t  they could produce 
s t i l l  m0t.e acceptable items. 
It is the  job of the  Korea Purbhaoing Agency (u.s, Armed ~ o r c e s )  t o  buy 
items of prescribed quality,  proper delivery ard at the lowest possible price. 
USOIPs ro le  is t o  a s s i s t  the Ibreans t o  meet these requirements. 
With t h e  cooperation of KPA, a l lst  of items were examined, The 
- '9uy American" policy determined where most of the products required would 
- be purchased, It was therefore decided t o  l imi t  our a c t i v i t i e s  t o  a s s i s t  
i n  those items now being purchased offshore, In  practice, t h i s  was 
mostly from Japan. In  additiorl t o  commodity purchasing, there was also 
purchasing f o r  t h e  PX System, 
- 
- 
It was during t h i s  p e r i d  t h a t  the highly sensi t ive negotiztions between 
Korean and Japan were taking place, looking towards establishing normalization 
of relations.  In  addition t o  the poss ib i l i ty  of increased sales, there was 
an important psychological necessity t o  have goods used i n  Korea, purchased . 
i n  Korea, 
- 
- 
With the  cooperation of the Armed Forces, numerous discussions were 
held i n  Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington, A t  t h e  request of the Country Team, 
an investigating team was sent  here from the Department of Defense i n  
Washington t o  study methods of a s s i s t ing  i n  t h i s  process, Simultaneously, 
the development of the  Vietnamese s i tua t ion  created further  poss ib i l i t i e s  
f o r  Korean sales, including construction and manpower contracts, 
- 
- The combined effort  of the  Korean Government and KPA, with an a s s i s t  
from USOM, resulted i n  an increase i n  s a l e s  f o r  use i n  Korea, In  1965 there 
waa an increase i n  sales t o  $38,34.2,000, and the oal  f o r  1966, which we 
have every reason t o  believe w i l l  be reached, i s  f 50,000,000, Contracts for  
construction and se.micee i n  V J 9 t  Nam a s  of August 31, 1966 were approximately 
$32 million, while comodity, military,  and PX sa les  f o r  delivery i n  V i e t  Nam 
were $24 million f o r  the sane period. This conrpares with t o t a l  exports t o  
Viet Man f o r  :.$I65 of $19 million. 
Tourism , ..'.,.. 
While tourism is not i n  i t s e l f  involved i n  commodity exporting, i t  does 
create the poss ib i l i t i e s  of la rge  foreign exchange earnings, and a l so  helps 
develop the demand f o r  Korean exports, Because of th is ,  we began examining 
the poss ib i l i t i e s  involved i n  t h i s  f ie ld.  It did not take us long t o  
discover tha t  Korea possessed the potent ia l  f o r  substant ial  t o u r i s t  earninps. 
It also did not take long t o  discover, t h a t  even from a layman9s.point of 
view, the  f a c i l i t i e s  available were inadequate and not up t o  internat ional  
standards, 
Although the record showod t h a t  i n  1964 there were approximately 25,000 
v i s i to r s  t o  Korea, only about 1,000 were actual ly touris ts ,  Even accepting 
the t o t a l  figure, it seemed sma?,l i n  comparison t o  the  poss ib i l i t i e s ,  
I n  1961, under t he  sponsorship of t h e  U, S. Department of Commerce, 
a study e n t i t l e d  "The Future of Tourism i n  t he  Pac i f ic  and Far Eastw had 
been made by Checchi & Company of tlashington, One chapter out of twenty- 
one chapters was devoted t o  South Korea. Even when t h i s  repor t  was writ ten,  
it predicted t h a t  by 1968 ';here could be 120,000 visi toi-s coming t o  Korea. 
Rut t he  conditions, f a c i l i t i e s  and se rv ices  described a s  then ex i s t i ng  i n  
t h a t  repor t  had hardly changed between 1961 and 1964. The lk lke r  H i l l  
r e s o r t  had been completed but  i t  had not f u l f i l l e d  i ts  promise a s  an a t t r ac -  
t i o n  f o r  GIs and tou r i s t s ,  and was operating unprofitably, 
The lbreans concept of a vacation which they enjoyed, consisted 
going t o  one of t he  mountain areas, of ten hilt around an old Ruddhist 
temple, and r e s t i ng  qu ie t ly  i n  simple surroundings, enjoying the  becuty and 
t r a n q u i l i t y  of nature. Those au tho r i t i e s  in te res ted  i n  tourism had b u i l t  
a number of t o u r i s t  ho te l s  i n  var ioas  p a r t s  of Korea, i n  t he  mountains and 
remote c i t i e s .  There were plans t o  build hos te l s ,  spend money on roads 
t o  mountain temples and remote areas,  There was a scheme t o  develop CheJa 
Island i n t o  a s o r t  of Bermuda, 
The Koroa Touris t  Service ownes and operates t he  th ree  l a r g e s t  ho t e l s  
i n  Seoul, t he  t o u r i s t  ho te l s  throughout t he  country, t h e  foreigners1 coxnmissary, 
and other  f a c i l i t i e s ,  The Korea Touris t  Bureau, which was financed by the  Korea 
Tourist  Service, was presumably t he  promotion agent f o r  tourism, All t o u r i s t  
a c t i v i t i e s  were under the  d i rec t ion  of t he  Ministry of Transportation, 
I n  addit ion,  there  was through ai rplane service  on the  in te rna t iona l  
route between Japan and Hong Kong but  Seoul was a s i d e  t r i p  z t  ex t r a  cost ,  
There was no deluxe c l a s s  ho t e l  i n  existence. Restaurants, t ransport ion 
and above a l l ,  t o u r i s t  shopping, was not up t o  the  standards t h a t  would 
i n v i t e  the  in te rna t iona l  middle-ciass t ou r i s t .  
fho bes t  po t en t i a l  source of t o u r i s t s  is Japapn. With t he  conclusion 
of t h e  Korean-Japanese normalization t rea ty ,  and the  sul~sequ.ent opening of  
Korea t o  t he  Japanese, there  was every possible  hope t h a t  tho Japanese would 
come t o  Korea i n  l a r g e  numbers, 
- Early i n  1965 t h e  Pac i f ic  A i r  Transport Association held a convention 
- i n  Seoul, This brought a grea t  many profess ional  t o u r i s t  agents t o  Korea, 
WLth the  ass is tance of t he  Minister  of Transportation we arranged a meeting 
of t h e  leading wholesale t o u r i s t  agents t o  discuss  with them s t eps  t h a t  should 
be taken t o  develop tourism, This meeting was very f r u i t f u l ,  They introduced 
a revolution a t  the  conference requesting s t eps  be taken t o  include Seoul 
- 
a s  a "free stop" i n  a i r  t ravel .  Subsequently, t h i s  was adopted by Internat ional  
- Air Transport Association (IATA) and .has been vo:ly' ',tclpful. 
We began a se r i e s  of conferences w i t h  t h e  whole range of public and 
pr ivate  o f f i c i a l s  in te res ted  i n  tourism. Many suggestions were discussed 
and some adopted. k t  t h e  request of t h e  I l inis ter  of l'ransportation, USOM 
brought t o  Korea Eir. Morton D. Kauffman as a consultant on tourism. After 
several months of work i n  his part ,  he prepared a lengthy and detai led 
report with recommendations f o r  action. The repc-t i s  now being printed, 
and will short ly  be dis t r ibuted t o  the government. However, a short 
surmhry of t h e  repor t  had been previously delivered t c j  t h e  government. In  
this report 14.r. Kauffman predict3 t h a t  i n  t h e  year 1971 there  w i l l  be  
200,000 v i s i t o r s  t o  Korea, who w i l l  spend approximt~tely $100 n i l l i o n  i n  
for9ign exchange, I f  realized, this will make t h e  second la rges t  
foretien exchange earner, a f t e r  manufactured goods. He c l ea r ly  indicates  
those predictions w i l l  come t r u e  only i f  ~ u ~ g e s t i o n s  and recomendations 
contained i n  h i s  report  a r e  implemented. 
Wen before Mr. Kauffman's a r r iva l ,  it became evident t h a t  one of t h e  
mout important needs was tha t  of a deluxe hotel .  In h i s  report  he s t a t e s  
(July, 1966) a minimal need f o r  500 nex ho te l  rooms. A t  t h e  ruquest of 
t h e  Banister of Transportation, we comunicat ed w?.th t h e  three leading 
hote l  chains, Hilton, Intercontinental ,  and Sherbton Hotels, A 1 1  th ree  
wrote t h a t  they were very interested i n  t h e  poss ib i l i t ies .  During t h e  
t r i p  on which I accompanied IUir. Oh Pum Sik through t h e  United States ,  we 
v i s i t ed  t h e  headquarters of a l l  three ho te l  chains, and they agreed t o  
send representatives t o  Korea t o  study t h e  poss ib i l i t i e s  of building a 
hote l  here. By t h a t  time, Korean Government au thor i t ies  had decided t h a t  
building more faciLit5as i n  t h e  countryside would not be productive, and 
became very in teres ted  i n  t h e  poss ib i l i t y  of such a major ho te l  expansion i n  
Seoul, A s  a resu l t ,  t he  Economic Planning Board has employed an American 
consulting f i rm t o  make a f e a s i b i l i t y  study of t h e  poss ib i l i t y  of increas- 
ing ho te l  rooms and/or building a new hote l  i n  Seoul. A great d e a l  of 
in t e re s t  has been aroused i n  these poss ib i l i t i e s ,  and numerous individuals 
and t h e  government i t s e l f  a r e  awaiting the  r e s u l t s  of t h i s  study t o  
determine exactly what shou3.d be done i n  t h i s  area. I n  t h e  meantime, with 
ROK sponsored financing, a number of exis t ing hotels  a re  expanding and 
improving t h e i r  services and f a c i l i t i e s .  
Tourism i s  already substant ial ly  increasing. Many groups of Japanese 
a r e  already coming t o  Korea, and at t h e  present time it is  often d i f f i c u l t  
t o  obtain adequate hote l  space 4.n Seoul. A number of important conference? 
and conventions have been held here, and there i s  every hope f o r  ih bright 
future f o r  tourism. 
However, the number of tou r i s t s ,  length of t h e i r  stay, and t h e  amount 
they spend here w i l l  be determined by t h e  posi t ive act ion taken by t h e  
Korean Goverxunent and t h e  businessmen involved i n  tourism t o  improve t h e i r  
f a c i l i t i e s ,  restaurants,  transportation, hote l  service, museums, cu l tu ra l  
a t t r ac t ions  and a l l  other f a c i l i t i e s  t h a t  a r e  necessary f o r  t h i s  purpose. 
Much i s  still t o  be done. 
One of the planned a t t rac t ions  is the development of a consumer goods 
display center, central ly located, a t t rac t ive ly  l a i d  out, wi th  attract,ive 
displays, designed t o  i n t e r e s t  foreign tour is  L _: arvl b ~ ~ r e r o .  The recently 
b u i l t  Bando-Chosen Arcade i s  an nice looking baildine;, but t h o  displays 
and s to res  a re  i n  the t uaditional Korean s tyle ,  designed t o  a t t r a c t  the 
Korean buyer. Lacking any other f a c i l i t y  i t  ncv does a t t r a c t s  tour is t s ,  
but the  new proposed d i s p l w  ~ a n t e r  should be much more effect ive,  
Seoul arid Korea have very many interest ing and beaut ifcl  palaces, museums, 
parks,'-places of h i s to r i ca l  i n t e r e s t  and natural bezuty. Korean products, 
properly displayed and with proper s tore  service can develop substant ial  earn- 
ings from tour i s t s  shopping here, Properly organized and well developed, 
Seoul and Kores can f u l f i l l  the promise indicated i n  the  Kauffnan report. 
Exnort Develo~ment Office Activi t ies  
A t  the :cohclueion 'of lour work here, and a t  the  request of the Mission 
Director, we prepared t he  following list of a c t i v i t i e s  i n  which t h i s  of f icc  
participated. This list i n  itself can a s s i s t  a s  a guide t o  the  wide  areas 
tha t  were involved i n  t h e  whole 3evelopment of the  export program, 
1. P ~ t t i i l g  foreign businessmen i n  touch with the appropriate businessmen, 
traders,  KOTRA, ICi'A and government of f ic ia ls ;  and US014 and h b a s s y  personnel. 
This often 5nvolves personal introd-action and attendance, 
2, Assisting Korean businessmen with various problems concerning expr,rts. 
Putting them i n  touch with buyers; giving information r e  export markets and 
contacts with Korean and U.S, of f i c i a l s ,  
3. Correspondence with Korean and foreign businessmen. 
4. Maintaining contacts with: 
Business Organizations including: 
Korean Businessmens Association 
Korean Traders Association 
Korean Chanber of Commerce 
IIational Federcc.tion of Medium Industry Cooperatives 
Korean Marketing Association 
Anierican Chamber of Commerce 
5. Keeping all export and export-related s t a t i s t i c s .  Naintaining book of 
a t a t i s t i c s  and charts, 
6, Contacts with R O E  re export development 
MCI lfinister Park Choong Tloon 
Vice Il inister Lee Chul Seung 
MCI - exports & - Asst, Minister K i m  Woo Keun 
finance enri c red i t  Overseas Marketing Section 
Market Promotion Section 
ICI - technical - Asst. Minister Lee \loo Ryong 
problems on export First Industry Section--garment, 
ceramics, canning 
KOTRA President Oh P~rn Sik 
MOFA Asst, Minister Chyun Sang Jin 
Trade Promotion Section 
MOFA Export Developuent 
EPB 
7, Tourism and Hotels 
Vice Minister Kim Hak Y u l  
Yang Yoon Se, Chief, Overall Program Section - 
technical development 
1.linister Ahn Kyung 1 0  
Bureau of Trourism 
KTS - HTB General Illn Il Hwan, PresLdent 
Hotels & a i r l i n e s  
Travel agents 
8. Military Purchasing f o r  Use i n  :<ores 
Memberrdhi,p'.Join$; US-ROE Milit'aiy ,Purchasing: Camnif t the 
I P A  
U,S. Corps of Engineers 
KIUG 
PX - Korea 
MCI - Military Purchasing Section 
Association of I U i t a r y  Goods Suppliers i n  Korea 
Korea Military Con~t~ruct ion Contractors Association 
9. Military Purchasing f o r  Use i n  Viet ?Jam 
Same group as  No. 8 
Ministry of Labor 
10. Consultants 
KUl'RA Ek. Jerome Udell 
Tourism 14r. llort Kauffhan 
Co~nr~umer Good Display Mr. Theodore Jones (under Dick Goodrich, 
Center m) 
IESC (assis t ing)  Mr. Lee Burns 
Arbitration Korean Chamber of Commerce 
Export Insurance MCI 
Procedures ItC I 
Marketing w o r t  f N C I ,  KCIEfA 
11. Liaison with h b a s s y  Economic S e c t i ~ n ,  Czmercial Attache 
12. USOM Joint  Activi t ies  
Export Promotion C o d t t e e  
Foreign Investment Inducement Coinnittee 
Small & Medium Business Committee 
Export Finance - G i l  Brown 
13. Work with EPSC (Export Promotion Sub-committee) 
Numerous meetings with Co-steering committee members, 
Asst. M.nister K i m  \loo Keiln, %I 
Constant meetings with co-sacretariat  member Yam Chang 
Dong, ICI 
14eeting with USOTZ members of Working Committees 
Preparing agenda 
Writing minutes 
Constant follow-up on tlcrk of Vorkine: Committees 
Translating and s k a r i s i n e  minutes Gf Iforking Committees 
Arranging meetings of EPSC 
(2) A l l  agendas, minutes, etc., a re  checked with the approved by 
Korean counterparts. Final agenda requires approval of Co- 
cha inen  Vice I l inis ter  Lee Chul Seung aid Deputy Director Roger 
Ernst. A 
(a' 
(3) Annual analysis and report prepared for  ora l  and written delivery 
t o  ECC. (DP1.I Chung and Director Joel  erns stein) This r e ~ o r t  has 
had great in3uence i n  formulating the following year's POX? 
"Export Promotion Policy 15 Program" 
4 Annual Preparation of "Export Promotion Policy & Program" 
This i s  one of th:-&st inportant jobs of the  gear. This work is 
in i t i a t ed  by Vice IEnister  Lee Chul Seung and Amicus Pbst. It has heen 
follawed by a se r i e s  of info- working meetings ins ide  USOH with various 
division chiefs and appropriate s ta f f  members, A s e r i e s  of meetings a re  
held with Vice I an i s t e r  Lee and Assistant Ifinister Kin. trsually G i l  Rrom 
attends the  meeting on problems of finance, There i s  ~t l e a s t  one meeting 
with 1,linister Park Choong H o o ~ ~ ,  There are  usually several m e e t i n ~ s  with 
Director Bernstein, and the final USOll position paper is approved by him, 
15. Translating t rade pol ic ies  and regulations f o r  dis tr ibut ion throughout 
usm, 
16, Arranging and organizing Participant Training Programs such a s  
(1) Trainees f o r  International Marketing I n s t i t u t e  - Cambridge Mass. 
(2) Trainees f o r  Tourism and IIotel IIawaii, 
(3) Teams t o  visit neighboring countries 
a, Garments 
b, Handicrafts 
C, Ceramics 
17, Organizing and ass is t ing  t rade missions t o  and from Korea, 
18, Trips t o  neighboring countries t o  work with Korean Overseas Trade 
Missions 
19, Visits t o  factories  throughout Korea, 
20, Speaking a t  seminars, t rade meetings, universi t ies ,  conferences, KMAG'etc, 
The following quotation of the  last paragraph of the attached report is 
well worth repeating, 
"Korea can well he proud of its tremendous progress i n  developing its 
exports, Its success has been due primarily t o  t h e  e f fo r t s  of Korean 
themttelves. Govement, pr ivate  organizations and businessmen have each 
contributed t h e i r  share, Whatever par t  we outsiders have been able t o  con- 
t r ibu te  t o  t h i s  e f f o r t  has only been possible because of the  deteilnined Korean 
drive t o  sell more overseas. This s p i r i t ,  plus Korea's inherent potent ial  
i n  a wide variety o.? export products, makss Korea's export prospects 
bright, The directions of e f fo r t  needed t o  real ize these prospects fully 
have already been identified. t h a t  is needed i s  t o  carry on with the  work, 
along the l i n e s  t h a t  have been indicattil," 
The world w i l l  learn a lesson from these remarkable achievements, It 
has not been easy fo r  a people whose t radi t ion  and his tory was one of 
learning ra ther  than trade t o  c d i n e  the best of the i r  old t radi t ions  with 
the modern ways required t o  deve l~p  an indus t r ia l  economy, They a r e  succeed- 
ing  beyond the fondest hopes o f  several years ago. What they have done i s  
wellwol,.thstudying so tha t  other may l ea rn  from t h e i r  ac t iv i t i e s ,  
